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Sanity, Madness and Alice 
N E I L S O N G R A H A M 
N E of the most interesting characters in Lewis Car-
roll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland is the Ches-
hire Cat. Unlike most of the creatures, the Cheshire 
Cat is sufficiently detached from his environment to be 
able to comment, in a fast, facetious sort of way, on the 
characters who share Wonderland with him, and one of his 
more challenging comments in particular deserves at-
tention. 
He tells Alice that everybody in Wonderland is mad. 
The exchange occurs after Alice has left the Duchess's 
kitchen and has had her dream-like wrestle with the pig-
baby. She sees the Cheshire Cat on the bough of a tree 
and asks it what sort of people live around here: 
"In that direction," the Cat said, waving its right 
paw round, "lives a Hatter: and in that direction," wav-
ing the other paw, "lives a M a r c h Hare . Visit either you 
like: they're both mad." 
"But I don'i want to go among mad people," Alice 
remarked. 
"Oh, you can't help that," said the Cat: "we're all 
mad here. I'm mad. You're mad." 1 
Leaving aside for the moment the unlikely question of 
whether Alice is mad, the problem is to know how far the 
Cat is justified in attributing insanity to Wonderland 
creatures. As a group, the creatures do strike us as a 
pretty odd crew (although very immediate to us and ulti-
mately likeable because childish) but is it really correct to 
call them mad? The Cat's remark seems to be too sweep-
ing to be helpful, and yet its very breadth is tantalising 
too. Even if Carroll could not have justified it in precise 
philosophical terms (that is now my task), he must have 
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written it in response to some positive sense he had of 
his creatures. I believe that the Cat is actually right and 
that a good deal of the charming, and strangely worrying, 
quality of Alice is due to the fact that some of the utter-
ances of some of the creatures are, from a certain stand-
point, insane. But insanity is a dubious notion nowadays, 
in view of the arguments of R. D. Laing and others for its 
abolition, so it will be as well for me to start by making 
clear what that standpoint is. 
In the beginning of Mark Twain's novel Pudd'nhead 
Wilson, Wilson makes a remark whose style and reception 
are intriguing. He has just arrived at the little township 
of Dawson's Landing and made the acquaintance of a 
group of citizens when there is an interruption: 
. . . an invisible dog began to yelp and snarl and howl 
and make himsel i very comprehensively disagreeable, 
whereupon young Wilson said, much as one who is think-
ing aloud — 
"I wish I owned half of that dog." 
"Why?" somebody asked. 
"Because I would ki l l my half." 
The group searched his face with curiosity, with an-
xiety even, but found no light there, no expression that 
they could read. They fell away f rom h im as from 
something uncanny, and went into privacy to discuss 
h i m . 2 
Two things seem to need elucidation here: first, the pecu-
liar character of Wilson's actual statement, "I wish I 
owned half of that dog, because I would ki l l my half," and 
second, the disturbed response of the citizens to it. 
The words and concepts which go into the making of the 
statement, the concepts of "owning," "half," "dog" and 
" k i l l , " are all perfectly well understood concepts, and they 
are strung together by Wilson with perfect grammatical 
propriety, and yet there is something strange about it 
nevertheless. We want to echo Alice's feelings at the Tea-
Party when she is confused by a remark of the Hatter's: 
"Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter's remark seem-
ed to her to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was 
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certainly English" (p. 68). Wilson's remark too is cer-
tainly English but it appears, in some respects, to have no 
sort of meaning in it, to be nonsensical, and I think we can 
locate the nonsensicality quite quickly. Wilson says he 
wishes to own half the dog, but that is impossible. It is 
possible, perhaps, to own a half share in a dog, but im-
possible to own half of it, for where would you divide it? 
While it lives a dog would seem to be indivisible. Similar-
ly, to talk about killing half a dog is too difficult an idea. 
To k i l l half is automatically to k i l l the whole. So it would 
seem that what Wilson is doing here is applying the con-
cept of half to the concepts of owning a dog and killing it 
quite inappropriately. And, of course, unnecessarily. A l l 
he need have said was, "I wish I owned that dog, because 
I would ki l l it," which would be rough justice, but at least 
it would have fitted the circumstances. 
So the remark can be called nonsensical, but why does it 
disturb the citizens of Dawson's Landing so? In the first 
place, it refuses to be tamed. It won't fit into their ac-
customed patterns of thinking. So they search Wilson's 
face for some sort of clue as to what he meant by it and 
are made even more anxious when they cannot find one. 
His expression is unreadable, and this seems to be the 
point. Wilson utters a nonsensical statement and yet, as 
far as the citizens can judge from his face, he himself is 
unaware of this fact. Or if he is aware of it he is giving 
nothing away. His motive, in other words, for making the 
statement is obscure, and when we cannot understand the 
motivation of others we are angry or anxious or hysteri-
cally amused. 
What sort of motivation might Wilson have had? He 
might have been wishing to make a joke. This is the usual 
reason in our culture for making nonsensical statements. 
The jokester takes liberties with meaning under cover of 
the comic, exploiting contradiction for cathartic effect. 
Recognizing his pose we may safely laugh. The person 
who uses nonsense structures (of which I take Wilson's 
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remark about the dog to be one) can be assimilated into 
our understanding because he is aware of two standards, 
but the person who is unaware of using nonsense structures 
cannot be so assimilated. Aware only of one standard, his 
own, such a man may seem to be mad. The difference 
between the jokester and the madman in this respect is 
that the jokester can step out of his joking role at will, 
whereas the madman cannot. We shall see presently that 
Wonderland creatures rarely fall into the category of the 
jokester. As people they are strangely serious, and since 
they deploy nonsensical statements of one kind or another 
doubts arise as to their sanity. But where does Wilson 
stand? He is clearly not joking (the citizens can find no 
sort of expression in his face which would have given them 
permission to laugh). Is he then insane? The citizens 
partly think so for they go on to label him "Pudd'nhead," 
a gentle form of "idiot" or "fool"; and this is their way of 
defending themselves from the threat presented by his ap-
parently motiveless use of the irrational. 
It seems to be the case that those who use language in 
a sufficiently nonconformist fashion in any society are 
ostracised, whether in the friendly manner of Pudd'nhead 
Wilson or more ferociously as lunatics. The absent-mind-
ed professor is isolated by suspicion masquerading as tol-
erance. Shakespeare's fools are called fools and (for the 
most part) rigidly confined by their superiors within the 
limits of the jester role in order that their insights may 
cut less ice. Society cannot tolerate more than a mini-
mum of nonconformity in the matter of language as in 
everything else and this is not surprising, for a base of 
semantic conformity is a prerequisite for meaningful com-
munication between people. If nonsense were the norm (a 
contradiction in terms) and no motivation for statements 
expected or required, then the result would be the loss of 
standardization in meaning, that is, in the last resort, a 
kind of collective insanity (another contradiction in terms). 
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In any particular interpersonal situation, if we are going 
to feel safe with our interlocutor, we need to be able to be-
lieve that he had a motive for uttering. In most cases this 
is self-evident. But if his statement was markedly uncon-
ventional (like Wilson's) then we need to be able to believe 
that he was making a joke or a mistake or that he had 
some other acceptable motive for speaking as he did. If 
we cannot discover a motive we lose contact with our inter-
locutor who may come, as a result, to appear insane. The 
attribution of insanity is clearly a relative one and says 
more, perhaps, about the relationship between me and my 
interlocutor (namely that contact has been lost) than 
about him alone, but it may still have its uses. 
Let us now turn to Alice and consider some of the char-
acters in the light of this relation between motive and 
sanity. First, the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon. In the 
famous virtuoso section from "The Lobster-Quadrille" in 
which the two of them converse with Alice about life un-
der the sea they employ a succession of puns (or quasi-
puns) and what is fascinating about their use of this device 
is the impossibility of it. They tell Alice about a fish 
called the whiting and the Gryphon asks her: 
"Do you know why it's called a whiting?" 
"I never thought about it," said Alice. "Why?" 
"It does the boots and shoes," the Gryphon replied 
very solemnly. 
Alice was thoroughly puzzled. "Does the boots and 
shoes!" she repeated in a wondering tone. 
"Why, what are your shoes done with?" said the 
Gryphon. "I mean, what makes them so shiny?" 
Alice looked down at them, and considered a little be-
fore she gave her answer. "They're done with blacking. 
I believe." 
"Boots and shoes under the sea," the Gryphon went on 
in a deep voice, "are done with whiting. Now you 
know." 
"And what are they made of?" Alice asked in a tone 
of great curiosity. 
"Soles and eels, of course," the Gryphon replied, rather 
impatiently: "any shrimp could have told you that" 
(pp. 96-97). 
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It is clear that the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon have no 
conception of what a pun is and yet their punning ability 
is superb. Alice goes on to refer to a song about a whiting 
which the Mock Turtle has sung a little while back (a 
song with a porpoise in it) and this provides the Mock 
Turtle with food for more punning: 
"If I'd been the whiting," said Alice, whose thoughts 
were still running on the song, "I'd have said to the 
porpoise, 'Keep back, please! W e don't want you with 
us!' " 
"They were obliged to have him with them," the 
Mock Turt le said. "No wise fish would go anywhere 
without a porpoise." 
"Wouldn't it, real ly?" said Alice, in a tone of great 
surprise. 
"Of course not," said the Mock Turtle . "Why, if a fish 
came to me, and told me he was going a journey, I 
should say 'With what porpoise?'" 
"Don't you mean 'purpose'?" said Alice. 
"I mean what I say," the Mock Turt le replied, in an 
offended tone (p. 97). 
That "in an offended tone" indicates that the Mock Turtle 
genuinely does not make in his own mind the distinction 
implied by a pun. He takes it for granted that Alice will 
know what he means by the words he uses and is im-
patient when she does not. There is no question of his 
deliberately trying to confuse Alice — he is a very serious-
minded old gentleman — nor of his using puns as a joke 
or by mistake, any of which motivations would reassure 
us that he had the same semantic standards as we have. 
No, we are confronted instead with the extraordinary 
phenomenon of a character able to use puns yet unaware 
of the aberrative nature of puns. The reader in this sit-
uation is unable to identify the thought processes which 
govern his speech for those processes are literally incon-
ceivable, and he is, as a result, both charmed and per-
plexed. In the context of Alice the Mock Turtle and the 
Gryphon may safely excite laughter, but in the real world 
the man who used puns without realising that he did so 
would disturb us deeply, so much so that we might be 
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tempted to label him insane, or a prodigy . . . but then 
we would never meet him. 
The Hare and the Hatter present similar problems. 
They welcome Alice to the Tea-Party with the cry, "No 
room!" though there is, in fact, all the room in the world, 
on the face of it a strange thing to do. The context is 
familiar. Alice comes upon a table set out under a tree 
at which the March Hare and the Hatter are having tea 
with the Dormouse between them. 
T h e table was a large one, but the three were crowded 
together at one corner of it. "No room! N o room!" 
they cried out when they saw Alice coming. "There's 
plenty of room!" said Alice indignantly, and she sat down 
in a large arm-chair at one end of the table (p. 66). 
Alice exposes the literal untruth of their statement by 
sitting down, but this may be to miss the point. Why did 
they say "No room!"? No reason is suggested or even, I 
think, implied. And it is this, not the facts or otherwise 
of the case, which intrigues. As with Wilson's remark 
about the dog, their remark is impossible to reconcile with 
the reality to which it is supposed to refer, a largely 
empty table; it lacks a rationale, and a mystery is thereby 
located in the minds of the Hare and the Hatter, just as 
a mystery was located in the minds of the Mock Turtle 
and the Gryphon as a result of their impossible use of 
puns. Essentially it is, again, a question of motive, or the 
lack of it. Without the assumption of motive in speech, 
meaning is in jeopardy, just as without the assumption of 
motive in morals, responsibility ceases to exist and jus-
tice disappears. Sanity is dependent on an orthodoxy of 
motive and in this case the Hare and the Hatter flout it 
with fine unconcern. They go on to offer Alice wine when 
there is none and to ask her riddles which have no an-
swer, and yet they see nothing odd in either of these be-
haviours. I do not believe we have cause to attribute to 
them a joking motive or a mistaken one, or even an ag-
gressive one, consequently, on the definition I am touting, 
they are insane. 
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As, of course, is the Caterpillar. The Caterpillar is an 
ill-mannered, petulant character who, from the safety of 
his perch on the mushroom, treats Alice with notable dis-
dain. He terminates the interview without warning and, 
as he's walking off through the grass, throws over his 
shoulder the remark, "One side will make you grow taller, 
and the other side will make you grow shorter" (p. 52). 
He refers, of course, to the mushroom. But mushrooms 
don't have sides, they are round, so this confuses. The 
Caterpillar's advice seems not to match the reality to 
which it is supposed to refer, and the interesting thing 
about this mismatch is that it does not, as far as we can 
judge, interest the Caterpillar. We cannot, therefore, know 
why he said what he did say, consequently we are my-
stified, perhaps to the point of laughter. Evidently in 
Carroll's Wonderland the creatures do not always have 
discernible motives for making unconventional statements 
so that we are cast adrift. 
Consider the Tea-Party again. The Dormouse tells a 
story, in between bouts of sleeping, about three little girls 
at the bottom of a treacle well. They drew all manner of 
things, says the Dormouse, everything that begins with an 
M : " 'Why with an M? ' said Alice. 'Why not?' said the 
March Hare. Alice was silent" (p. 73). And well she might 
be. The March Hare's "Why Not?" actually recommends 
contingency and there is no easy answer to such a recom-
mendation. Contingency is fine in theory but awkward 
in practice. If it were universal nothing would hold and 
the distinction between sanity and madness (among others) 
would disappear. Insanity is only meaningful in the con-
text of sanity, just as nonsensical statements are only re-
markable in a society which habitually speaks sense. But 
there is excitement in playing with insanity in a basically 
sane context, and that is partly what Alice is doing. The 
context is sane. The book is in English and written in 
such a way that most of it invites our understanding on 
one plane or another. If we don't actually think of Won-
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derland creatures as lunatics, despite the insane language 
habits which I have isolated, it is because so much of their 
affective and intellectual behaviour makes acceptably good 
sense. Even, ultimately, their "insane" utterances. There 
may be no obvious motive for the kind of statement we 
have been looking at but in the larger perspective the key 
to all such anti-communicative behaviour is fear. A t bot-
tom, Wonderland creatures are afraid of Alice and the one 
meaningful explanation it is possible to give for a context-
antagonistic utterance like "No room!" is that the Hare 
and the Hatter cannot face the reality of Alice's approach. 
Alice is a real live girl-child, dedicated (though she wouldn't 
put it thus) to the exposure of humbug, open, direct and 
largely unafraid, and for the insecure adult figures who 
people Wonderland these qualities represent a major 
threat. Who knows but Alice might see through them! 
They remain solitary because their mode is the defensive 
mode. One can almost discern a conspiracy operating to 
prevent Alice getting onto their wavelength, and it is cer-
tainly successful for contact is never established and Alice 
has no compunction about dismissing everybody at the 
end. There is pathos in this failure, sustained throughout 
the book, for Alice represents a once-for-all opportunity for 
Victorian adulthood to renew itself, an opportunity which 
it cannot, dare not, grasp. 
The idea of fear (and fear is at the root of insanity) 
provides a general context within which to interpret the 
solipsistic speech habits of the creatures in Alice, but there 
are no guidelines in the field. Alice, down among the al-
most-madmen, has a genuine communication problem on 
which, it could be said, her life depends, but because she 
sees no problem she is unaffected. Indeed, her incorrupt-
ible good sense acts as a buffer both for herself and for us 
against the illicit language habits of Wonderland crea-
tures. If Alice's linguistic and philosophical rectitude dim-
inish her as a person, they nevertheless provide the neces-
sary foil to the dangerous aberrations of the creatures. A 
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less fixed personality-type would have run the risk of en-
tering, and sharing in, the mad mind of Wonderland. As 
it is, Alice saves it for us. 
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